Threshold schemes have been used to protect secrets by distributing shares to participants. To protect two secrets, we can use two separate traditional schemes, say, a (t 1 , n 1 ) scheme and a (t 2 , n 2 ) scheme. If there are u (≤min(t 1 , t 2 ) ) participants involved in both schemes, each of these u participants must keep two different shares. This paper proposes a method that allows each common participant to keep only one share. Our method constructs two polynomials with u common crossover points. We give theoretical details and two demonstrative examples. This algorithm can also handle the collaboration between more than two schemes.
Introduction
To protect a secret, such as an encryption key, threshold scheme (also called secret sharing) has been proposed [3, 6, 5] to divide the secret into shares and the shares can be distributed to participants. When two or more secrets need to be protected, several separate schemes can be employed. If a participant is involved in two or more schemes, he must keep multiple shares.
Consider a case with a (3, 5) scheme and a (4, 6) scheme, and there are two common participants. This is similar to the situation where two banks want to collaborate. Each bank has a safe cabinet. The first bank has a group of five VPs responsible for its cabinet. Any three of the five can open it. The second bank has a group of six VPs handling their cabinet.
Any four of the six can open it. These two VP groups overlap by two. In other words, two VPs are working for both banks and are involved with both cabinets. This phenomenon has become more commonplace in today's co-operation practice between organizations. With the traditional threshold schemes, each common VP must carry two keys. In the digital case, each common participant must keep two shares, along with their corresponding indices. If a participant is involved with a large number of secrets, he needs to keep many shares which can be a burden. Note that the dealers of the two threshold schemes may not be the same person. One dealer may not know the secret of the other dealer. Therefore, we basically still have two separate schemes but they are to be designed in a way that facilitates collaboration in terms of common participants.
In this paper, we propose a method for constructing two (or more) threshold schemes allowing each common participant to keep only one share. Suppose that we have a ) , ( 1 1 n t scheme and a ) , ( 2 2 n t scheme with
) common participants.
Using Shamir's polynomial approach [6] , the first curve is decided arbitrarily as long as p is chosen with both schemes in mind. From the common crossover points, the second curve can be easily constructed.
The detailed construction method for a simple two-scheme case is presented in Section 2.
Section 3 discusses cases with more than two schemes. Section 4 gives conclusions. Two numerical examples are shown in Appendix. , where 
A Simple Case with Two Secrets

Curve Construction
. One way to do it is to compute any arbitrary polynomial of
Some special cases may need attention. When Since each coefficient can take p possible values, the probability that )
which is very close to zero. In other words, the set 
For convenience, let's call these
and apply them to the interpolation polynomial in the Lagrange
(
The result polynomial
will take the following form:
A numerical example is given in Appendix to demonstrate the above procedure.
In Equation (3),
coefficient is a product of 2 t coefficients, and each coefficient takes value in the range of
When every value in the range is equally likely, the probability of 
Share Distribution
Dealer 1 distributes ) ( 1 i f D i  to participants i, where 1 1 n i   . Note that the evaluation of ) ( 1 i f in Equation (1) is done over p Z . Dealer 2 obtains 2 n values { 2 2 1 ), ( ' n j j f D j    } by evaluating ) ( 2 j f over p z . He eliminated u values in { j D' } that are identical to those in { i D },
Secret Reconstruction：
The reconstruction process (to reveal the secret) is exactly the same as that in Shamir's scheme [6] .
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Given any subset of 1 t of the 1 n values 1 1 , , n D D  , we can find the coefficients of ) ( 1 x f by interpolation [1, 4] , and then evaluate
to reveal the first secret. 
to reveal the second secret.
Knowing only
) values, on the other hand, does not suffice in order to discover D (resp. D ).
Parameter Consideration：
The above algorithm can not be used when
. If such a situation exists and the two secrets are different, traditional threshold schemes must be employed. Having
is not desirable from the security point of view, since the u common participants, possibly from outside, can access the secret without the knowledge of non-common (pure local) participants.
It is safer that more than u participants are always required in the reconstruction of the secret, 
Curve Construction
Dealer 1 is the first dealer to act and he uses 
would not be identical to ) ( 1 i f . The probability that the constant terms are the same between the two polynomials is 1/p. Since the 
. As we discussed in Section 2.1, the probability of two polynomials constructed by different dealers end up identical to each other (a conflict) is very small, especially when the p value is sufficiently large. If the dealers decide to completely avoid this highly unlikely conflict, they could send each other a subset of their points and warn each other if the subsets are identical.
/ 14
In the construction process, if
  in order to make sure that
Some Discussions
It is obvious that the security of the proposed scheme is the same as the traditional scheme [6] .
That is, fewer than [1] , which is the same as the one of Shamir's scheme in [6] . For more analysis on threshold scheme see [2, 7] .
The proposed algorithm can be modified to handle more complex situations where the collaborations between the schemes are of a different nature. For example, there are five dealers responsible for five secrets with five schemes, and the schemes are of (2, 3), (3, 5), (4, 6), (5, 7) and (7, 9) . The (2, 3) scheme and the (3, 5) scheme have 2 common participants. The (4, 6) scheme, the (5, 7) scheme and the (7, 9) scheme have 4 common participants.
The dealers may or may be the same person, and they may or may not know each other's secrets. As long as they pass u shares to the common participants, the curves they construct would be valid. Another point of notice is that the dealers and participants in the proposed schemes, who are similar to those of Shamir's scheme, are honest.
Conclusions:
This paper proposes an effective collaboration mechanism for two or more threshold schemes to insure that each common participant keeps only one share. They achieve this by constructing polynomials with a number of common crossover points. When the polynomials are sequenced in an increasing order of their degree, the construction is always successful.
When the co-operation between organizations becomes more popular and common participants are involved in multiple secrets, the proposed method can reduce the storage requirement and increase the security and convenience.
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Appendix: Two Numerical Examples
Example 1: collaboration between a (3, 5) scheme and a (4, 6) scheme.
Suppose there are two secrets (integers 1 and 3) that could be protected by two dealers, separately, with two traditional threshold schemes: one (3, 5) scheme and one (4, 6) scheme.
Let's the five participants involved with the first secret form Group 1, and let's the six participants for the second secret form Group 2. These two groups overlap by two. That is, each one of these two common participants must keep two shares. For easy lookup, we list the related parameters here:
Part 1 of Example 1: Curve Construction
Step 1: Dealer 1 constructs a (3, 5) threshold scheme for Secret 1 (integer 1).
Using our construction method, the dealers agree on a large prime number p as 
where x=0, 1, 2, … , 6.
When x takes values 0, 1, … , 5, this curve produces six points:
From the above six points, he picks up two points at random, say, (1, 6) and (2, 1), for the two common participants. These two points are handed over to Dealer 2.
Step 2: Dealer 2 constructs a (4, 6) threshold scheme for Secret 2 (integer 3). 
, where x = 0, 1, 2, … , 6. Figure 1 shows the cross points between two curves, )
, in the 2D space.
Because of the use of modular arithmetic, the curves are periodic. Note that 2 f is formed by an addition of 2 t polynomials of degree 
It can be seen that each coefficient indeed takes all values of the range with proximately equality frequency, except the constant term. From Table 1 and distributes them to the six participants. The first two participants are common between the groups, and each of them needs to keep only one share.
Part 3 of Example 1: Secret Reconstruction.
The reconstruction process is exactly the same as that in Shamir's traditional scheme [6] .
For Secret 1 protected by the (3, 5) scheme, given any set of 1 t of these 1 n values (
we can find the coefficients of ) ( 1 x f by interpolation [1, 4] , and then evaluate
(1) . By (1), we obtain the secret as follows
Case 2: Suppose that one common participant (e.g., (2, 1)) works with two non-common participants (e.g., (4, 3) and (5, 3) . Using Equation (1) Case 2: When one common participant (e.g., (1, 6) ) works with three non-common participants (e.g., (4, 6), (5, 4) and (6, 5) , where x = 0, 1, 2, … , 6.
Recall that Dealer 1's curve is 
